housing markets, housing policies, and government behaviors, will be examined to provide a better understanding of housing behavior in urban China. I hypothesize that these macrolevel factors shape housing contexts and thus housing behavior in China. Furthermore, they vary significantly across cities, leading to different patterns of housing choice.
Literature review and the research context Housing behavior has been an important research subject in social sciences, and a large volume of literature has been generated, mainly in market economies. Two different approaches have evolvedöthe economic and the sociodemographic. Assuming households are economically rational, the economic perspective argues that households choose a certain type of housing to maximize utilities within a given budget constraint (Arnott, 1987) . Thus income, assets, and prices are the most important factors affecting housing behavior (Henderson and Ioannides, 1989; Plaut, 1987) . In general, high household income and low housing prices encourage homeownership. In contrast, the sociodemographic approach argues that, in addition to income and housing prices, demographic characteristics of households (such as age and family size) and life-cycle events (such as birth of children and marriage) are significant factors affecting housing choice (Clark and Dieleman, 1996; Deurloo et al, 1994; MorrowJones, 1988) . In general, when single persons become married, when couples turn into families, and when people grow older, they are more likely to shift to ownership. Furthermore, changes in economic circumstance, such as price inflation and increasing mortgage rates, can also affect residents' tenure choice Deurloo et al, 1994; Rudel, 1987) .
Overall, the combined economic and sociodemographic literature on housing choice has provided a good explanation of housing behavior in Western cities. However, it is problematic to apply existing theories directly to urban China where a welfare-oriented housing system is under reform. First, although discrimination is often practised in housing markets (Massey and Denton, 1993) , Western models generally assume relative freedom of housing choice. Households choose different types of housing on the basis of mainly personal preference, family needs, and affordability. But in socialist urban Chinaöwhere public rental housing was the only choice for the majorityöthere was clearly much less freedom of choice. Although the recent reform has granted households a certain degree of freedom in housing choice, socialist institutions such as work units still constrain housing behavior (Huang and Clark, 2002; Li, 2000a) .
Second, with the domination of private housing in Western cities, housing markets are considered the only macrofactor affecting housing choice, and the role of the government is often downplayed. Even in European countries such as Britain where the government plays a more important role in the housing system, private housing has always been preferred (Saunders, 1990) . The recent privatization and residualization in the public sector have further reduced the role of governments and strengthened the attractiveness of private housing (Burrows, 1999) . Yet, in urban China, the government (at both central and local level) and government agencies (for example, work units and housing bureaus) have played and continue to play significant roles in housing provision and allocation. Furthermore, housing reform in China is decentralized so that it is local governments who design the actual reform programs and determine the timetable and degree of reform. With large regional differences in China, it is likely that housing reform will be carried out differently across cities, which may lead to different patterns of housing behavior. After controlling for household characteristics and institutional factors, such as the role of work units and the household registration system, Huang and Clark (2002) argue that there are still considerable variations in tenure choice across cities, which cannot be explained by housing markets alone. They suggest that different local government behaviors may contribute to the intercity heterogeneity. This echoes the literature of an uneven economic development in China in which governments play a significant role (for example, Qi, 1995; Qian and Stiglitz, 1996) .
Thus the housing context in urban China is different from that in Western cities, especially now the housing system is undergoing dramatic changes and a new pattern of housing behavior is in the making. Yet research on housing behavior in China is very limited because of the lack of systematic data. On the basis of his case studies on Guangzhou and Beijing, Li (2000a; 2000b) argues that the housing market in China is segmented and there are different forces governing tenure decisions in different sectors. Li also argues that the traditional welfare-oriented housing system still constrains housing consumption, even in cities known for their openness and market orientation. Huang and Clark (2002) developed a framework based on the institutional relationships between the main actors in the housing systemöhouseholds, work units, and the governmentöto understand tenure decisions in urban China. The institutional relationships are defined through factors unique to the socialist housing system, such as household registration status, job rank, job seniority, and characteristics of work units. They argue that these institutional factors, together with household characteristics and housing market factors, determine tenure decision in urban China.
According to a national survey of more than 3000 urban households conducted in 1996, the rate of homeownership varies significantly across cities (figure 1). It ranges from 3.3% to 90.0%, with a mean of 46.8% and a standard deviation of 30.1%. Although public housing still dominates the rental sector in most cities, the rate of choosing Housing markets, government behaviors, and housing choicenonpublic rental (private and others) also varies considerably across cities (figure 2). It ranges from 0 to 100%, with a mean of 18.0% and a standard deviation of 25.6%. Although there is not an obvious spatial pattern, it is clear that housing choices, both in tenure and in housing type, vary significantly across cities. In this paper I aim to understand the underlying forces for different patterns of housing behaviors by conducting a case study of three cities. Whereas microlevel factors contribute to intracity differentiation in housing choice, macrolevel factors lead to intercity heterogeneity. To understand intercity variations in housing behavior, I will analyze different macrolevel constraints and opportunities that households in the selected cities face, and their consequent housing choices.
Housing reform in urban China: a national context As part of the institutional transition towards a market economy, housing reform was launched nationwide in 1988 after several pilot experiments. The goal is to introduce market mechanisms into a previously welfare-oriented housing system. To ensure a smooth transition, a dual system with``new policies for the new housing stock, old methods for the old housing stock'' has been adopted (State Council, 1998) . The coexistence of market mechanism and socialist institutions creates a unique context, which is further complicated by the decentralized reform in which local governments are given freedom to design and implement the actual reforms.
In the socialist era, housing was considered a welfare benefit, and was provided by the state through government agencies, such as municipal housing bureaus and work units. Although they benefited from extremely low rents, households had few options but to wait for public rental housing, which was allocated on the basis of a set of nonmonetary indicators, such as job rank, seniority and marital status (Bian et al, 1997) . Thus housing consumption was not a balance between housing markets, on the one hand, and personal preference, family needs, and affordability, on the other hand, as in the West. Instead, it was a result of a person's position within his or her work unit (or municipal city) that determined his or her access to housing, and his or her work unit's (or the municipal government's) status within the national economy that determined its ability to provide subsidized housing to its employees (Huang and Clark, 2002) . Aiming to create a functional housing market, the recent housing reform has changed the nature of the housing system in urban China. First, work units and housing bureaus are gradually giving up responsibility for housing provision and the existing public housing stock is being privatized (World Bank, 1992) . Sitting tenants of public housing are encouraged to purchase their occupied flats at subsidized prices; otherwise they have to pay increased rents (State Council, 1994) . Households which have not had access to public housing are expected to purchase housing from the private sector. However, because of the long history of housing subsidies in the socialist era, work units continue to provide housing subsidies in somewhat different forms. For example, Housing Purchase Subsidies (gou fang bu tie)öa cash lump-sum issued by work units in cities with housing prices (for a 60 m 2 unit of affordable housing) more than four times annual household income (State Council, 1998) öand the Housing Provident Fund (HPF, zhu fang gong ji jing)öa long-term compulsory housing saving of no less than 5% of a person's wage income and the same amount matched by his or her work unit (State Council, 1999) öhave been created to help households purchase housing. The continuation of housing subsidies indicates the persistence of socialist institutions in the housing system, and deters the formation of a private housing market, both of which affect housing behavior.
Second, the allocation of housing resources between the state, municipal government, and work units has changed. Instead of receiving housing investment from the central government as in the socialist era (Wu, 1996) , work units are now responsible for developing housing out of their own budgets (Logan et al, 1999) . Thus resourceful work units, such as high-ranking work units owned by ministries or the central government, can continue to provide heavy housing subsidies to their employees, who consequently are less likely to choose private housing. In contrast, employees in work units with few resources have no choice but to turn to the private sector for shelter. Similarly, housing bureaus in cities with more resources are also able to continue housing subsidies. As housing bureaus and work units continue to provide housing subsidies, affiliation to well-to-do cities and work units is likely to keep households in the public sector.
Third, in addition to reforms in the public sector, a new private housing market is emerging as`commodity housing' is rapidly being added to the stock. Yet most households, especially those in large cities, cannot afford it because of its high prices. Thus,`affordable housing' ( jingji shiyong fang), a type of commodity housing with government-controlled prices, has recently been promoted by the government to serve low-income and medium-income households (State Council, 1998) . In addition, individual owners are allowed to sell or lease their housing on the market, which offers another housing option to households (State Council, 1994) .
Fourth, the local municipal government plays a significant role in designing and implementing housing reform, which makes national generalization difficult. From the very beginning of housing reform, local governments were allowed to modify reform schemes provided by the central government based on local conditions. For example, the central government wants to deepen rent reform, and rent in principle should reach 15% of household wage income by 2000 (State Council, 1994) . But local governments are given the freedom to decide the amount of increase in rent as well as rent subsidies according to local income and price level of goods. In addition to major policies issued by the central government, each municipal government issues its own set of housing policies, which has led to different models of housing reform between cities (Wang and Murie, 1999) . This decentralized reform leads to different behaviors of local governments as a result of local politics, the personalities of the leadership, as well as local economic and housing reality, which in turn shape housing behavior.
In sum, the ongoing housing reform in urban China has provided households with various housing options. Although public agencies such as work units are retreating from housing provision, private developers as well as individual owners are beginning to shoulder the responsibility of housing provision. Yet, because of the history of welfare housing, work units, especially those with resources, continue to provide housing subsidies to their employees. At the same time, because of the decentralized reform, the local municipal government determines the direction and speed of the reform, which can be heavily influenced by the nature of work units and the economic structure in the city. Thus work units and the municipal government in a city can shape the local housing context that in turn affects households' housing behavior. To understand housing behavior better, case studies are needed at city level.
A case study of three cities Three spatially dispersed cities with different characteristics öBeijing, Chongqing, and Jiangyinöwere selected (figure 3). Beijing, the national capital with a population of 9.5 million (NBSC, 2002) , provides a unique context within which to examine the role of the government and the housing market in housing behavior. With more than 80% of fixed investment and employment in the state sector (table 1), Beijing's economy has been dominated by state-owned work units, which have been providing subsidized housing to their employees. In particular, there are many central or ministry-level work units in Beijing, which employ more than 30% of workers and staff in Beijing (NBSC, 2000) and attracted about half of the total fixed investment in Beijing during 1949^98 (BSB, 1999 . With rich resources and powerful policymakers, these work units often provide better housing and more subsidies than work units at municipal or lower level. Thus it is interesting to study Beijing where the development of a housing market and the progress of local reform are inevitably affected by the presence of many stateowned work units and especially central-level work units that are beyond the local government's jurisdiction and tend to maintain heavy housing subsidies.
Chongqing is a large inland city with a population of 6.60 million in 2000 (NBSC, 2002) which was promoted from a prefecture-level city to the fourth municipality directly under the administration of central government in 1996. The urban economy in Chongqing has also been dominated by state-owned sectors, with more than two thirds of fixed investment and employment in the state sector in 1988. As a city known for its state-owned heavy industries, the housing system in Chongqing shares similarities with many other industrial cities in China. The ongoing reform in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has resulted in an 8.4% unemployment rate because of massive layoffs (Hou and Xu, 1998) , which has significantly deterred the progress of housing reform and the development of a housing market. In addition, it is important to understand how SOE workers, who were very much favored in the socialist housing system, make their housing choices in the transitional housing system. BCB, 1998; CIPD, 1996; CSB, 1999; JCC, 1998; JSB, 1999; SSB, 1999 In contrast, Jiangyin (Jiangsu Province) is a small city with a population of 151500 located in the Yangtze River Delta (JSB, 1999) . The state economy in Jiangyin has always been small, and is becoming less important with the phenomenal growth of private and collective township-village enterprises (TVEs) in the past two decades. The dominance of the nonstate economy in Jiangyin has led to a weaker housing dependency between work units and households, and a more profound reform in the housing system than in most cities in China. A closer examination of housing choice in Jiangyin may shed light on housing behavior in other cities as they undertake the reforms.
Although there is no intention to use three cities to represent all cities in China, these cities were chosen to provide a better understanding of local housing contexts and their differences between large cities, inland industrial cities, and small coastal cities. The following analyses utilize published statistics, government policies, the 2000 Census summary tabulation, fieldwork data, and a survey of 500 households conducted in 1999 (see appendix). With the small scale of the survey and its consequent limitations, the survey results are used in conjunction with other data and information, all of which provide the basis for analyses and interpretations.
Housing choices in the three cities
Housing choices in the three cities are very different. Although there are some differences between the survey results and the 2000 Census results, the general patterns of housing choice are very similar, despite the small scale of the survey (table 2) . By 2000 about half of households in Beijing and two thirds of households in Chongqing owned their homes, compared with more than 85% of households in Jiangyin and 72% in all cities. Most owners in Beijing (37% versus 5%) and Chongqing (23% versus 16%) purchased public housing whereas many fewer purchased private (both commodity and affordable) housing despite the increasing availability of private housing. In contrast, owners in Jiangyin are much less likely to purchase public housing (17%) than private housing (31%). Similarly, renters in Beijing (34% versus 7%) and Chongqing (20% versus 7%) are more likely to live in public housing than in private housing. Overall, 71% of households in Beijing and 42% in Chongqing still lived in public housing in 2000, in contrast to less than a quarter (22%) of households in Jiangyin. According to the survey, work units are still the most important providers of public housing. In addition, self-build housing (zi jian fang) is becoming an important method for households to gain shelter and to achieve homeownership, especially in smaller cities. About 38% of households in Jiangyin live in self-build housing, compared with 13% in Beijing and 30% in Chongqing.
In summary, households in Beijing and Chongqing are much less likely to own, and more likely to live in public housing than those in Jiangyin. With regard to both the rate of homeownership and the share of public housing, Chongqing seems to be at a similar level to the national average, whereas Beijing and Jiangyin are at the two extremes in opposite directions. Now the question is why the patterns differ across cities.
Macrolevel constraints and opportunities
When households make their housing decisions, they face a set of constraints and opportunities influencing their choice. Although personal preference and household characteristics (microlevel factors) differentiate households' choices within a city, macrolevel constraints and opportunities defined by housing stocks, housing markets, and government behaviors contribute to different patterns of housing behaviors between cities. In this section I will examine these macrolevel factors in the three selected cities, and evaluate their impact on housing choice.
Housing stocks
Housing stocks in the three cities are very different as a result of different histories of urban development and economic structures. The housing stock in Beijing has changed significantly in the last fifty years. In 1949 the housing stock was mainly courtyard bungalows owned by a small group of large landlords (76.7%) and more than 80% of households were renters living in poor housing conditions (Sit, 1995) . Since 1949 the socialist transformation of existing private housing and the massive construction of public housing especially in the 1980s and 1990s have transformed a private housing stock into a predominantly public housing stock (figure 4, see over). The recent development of commodity housing has diversified the housing stock with increasingly more private housing. However, a large proportion of commodity housing investment in Beijing is for villas and luxury apartments (30.40% in 1997) and much less is for affordable housing (7.09%), which reduces the quantity of private housing provision (ECCRESY, 1999) . With the dominance of the state economy and thus massive construction of public housing, the housing stock in Beijing is dominated by public housing, especially work-unit housing, which has not been significantly changed by the recent availability of private housing. At the end of 1997 only 22.1% of housing stock in Beijing was private (commodity housing and old housing inherited from the pre-1949 era) and 63.4% was public housing under work-unit management (table 1) , compared with 52.73% and 37.19% nationwide. Yet housing consumption has been improved significantly, with per capita living space reaching 10.03 m 2 in 1998 (figure 4). Because of its strategic location in national defense, Chongqing has received massive state investment in heavy industries since 1949, which has also led to a housing stock dominated by public rental housing. Both local and central government invested heavily in public housing especially in the 1980s with more than 3 trillion yuan invested and 19.3 million m 2 built (CSB, 1999) . As a result, public housing by work units and housing bureaus accounted for more than 88% of the housing stock, and only 11.0% was private housing in 1993 (table 1). The dominance of public housing was somewhat changed by the recent development of commodity housing, especially since 1996 when Chongqing was promoted to the fourth municipality (figure 5). However, the poor performance of SOEs and consequently high unemployment rate have constrained the development of private housing in Chongqing. Although many households need housing desperately, there were 3.6 million m 2 of commodity housing vacant in 1998 in Chongqing (ECCRESY, 1999) . Because of the rapid development of both public and private housing, per capita living space has increased dramatically from 3.9 m 2 in 1980 to 9.2 m 2 in (CSB, 1999 . 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 2001 Different from both Beijing and Chongqing, the housing stock in Jiangyin has always been dominated by private housing. In 1952 private housing accounted for 74.3% of the housing stock in Jiangyin, and the share of private housing always remained high even during the Cultural Revolution when much private housing was confiscated in most other Chinese cities. As a small city dominated by nonstate TVEs, Jiangyin did not experience the public housing boom in the 1980s that Beijing and Chongqing did. The total housing stock increased slightly in the 1990s, mainly because of the construction of private housing including commodity housing and self-build housing (figure 6). By 1997 the newly built commodity housing accounted for 2.3 million m 2 . As a result, private housing accounted for more than 70%, and work units provided less than 30% of the total stock, which is very different from the stocks in Beijing and Chongqing. In addition to the structure of the urban economy and housing history, the rapid urbanization in Jiangyin also contributed to its high rate of private housing as farmers' privately owned houses in the suburbs became part of the city. Households in Jiangyin in general enjoy larger dwellings, with 12.32 m 2 per capita living space in 1997 compared with 9.66 m 2 in Beijing and 8.67 m 2 in Chongqing.
In summary, different histories of urban development and different economic structures have led to very different housing stocks in the three cities. With heavy state investment in both Beijing and Chongqing, though for different reasons, housing stocks are dominated by public housing. The recent development of commodity housing has diversified the housing stock; yet it has not changed the dominance of public housing. In contrast, the urban development in Jiangyin has relied more on the nonstate economy, and its housing stock is mainly privately owned housing. The recent availability of commodity housing further dilutes the presence of public housing in Jiangyin. These different stocks result in different options not only in housing tenure (rent versus own) and housing type (private versus public) but also in housing unit and neighborhood. Different from the private sector, households living in public housing can make their tenure decision only for their occupied units and they generally cannot choose desired units and neighborhoods. Thus households have fewer options in housing stocks dominated by public housing. For example, about two thirds (64.9%) of surveyed owners in Chongqing used to live in the same unit by renting and 71.2% claim , 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998) .
that they do not have options for an alternative unit and neighborhood, in contrast to 22.8% and 29.7% in Jiangyin (1999 survey) . Thus, it should not be surprising that households in Beijing and Chongqing are more likely to choose public housing and renting, and are more constrained in choosing preferred units and neighborhoods, while those in Jiangyin are more likely to choose private housing and homeownership, and enjoy more flexibility in choosing preferred housing units and neighborhoods.
Housing markets
Although housing stocks constrain housing options, housing prices determine the choice from existing options, and they vary significantly across cities. The high housing prices in Beijing have significantly constrained households' choice of private housing and homeownership. The average price for commodity housing in Beijing was 4815 yuan/m 2 ($582am
2 ) in 1998, much higher than the national average of 1807 yuan/m 2 , and the prices in Chongqing (994 yuan/m 2 ) and Jiangyin (1150 yuan/m 2 ) (table 3) . Although the annual wage income in Beijing is among the highest in the nation, a two-worker household has to pay about 20 years of their wage income for a modest 100 m 2 apartment, compared with 8.7 years in Chongqing and 6.0 years in Jiangyin. With such high prices, households in Beijing are much less likely to purchase commodity housing, with only 2.75% of households having done so by 2000. Affordability is also a concern in the public sector despite heavy subsidies. Below market prices, the price of public housing (1485 yuan/m 2 ) is still much higher in Beijing than in Chongqing and Jiangyin (table 3) . A two-worker household in Beijing still has to pay more than 6 years of their wage income for a 100 m 2 apartment in the public sector. Although 73% of surveyed owners in Beijing chose public housing for its cheaper-than-market prices, about 82% of surveyed renters in Beijing claimed they could not afford to purchase their occupied public housing unit (1999 survey) , and by 1998 only 49% of saleable public housing has sold (Wang and Murie, 1999) . High housing prices in Beijing clearly contribute to the low rate of homeownership as well as the choice of public housing. Table 3 . Housing costs and actual housing payments in three cities (source: BHRO, 1996; BSB, 1999; CHRO, 1997; CSB, 1998; ECCRESY, 1999; JSB, 1998; 1999; NSBC, 2002 Housing prices in Chongqing may not be as high as those in Beijing, but the poor performance of the state economy in Chongqing has greatly reduced household income, with annual wage income only 5710 yuan in 1998. Although the price/income ratio for public housing (calculated for two-worker households) seems to be low in Chongqing, many households do not have two fully employed workers because of the unprecedented high unemployment rate. The low affordability in Chongqing, mainly a result of low income rather than high housing prices, also leads to a relatively low rate of homeownership and to the choice of public housing. About 68% of renters in Chongqing claimed they chose to rent because they cannot afford to purchase housing (1999 survey) . Although the rate of homeownership in 2000 (68.69%) is close to the national average, the majority either purchased public housing (22.64%) or built housing themselves (29.83%), whereas only 16% of household purchased private housing (table 2) .
In contrast, although housing prices in Jiangyin were comparable with those in Chongqing, and much lower than those in Beijing (1150 yuan/m 2 for private and 668 yuan/m 2 for public housing), wage income was much higher (9576 yuan in 1998) than that in Chongqing. Furthermore, with a booming economy (GDP growth rate 9.34% in 2000) and a low unemployment rate (2.49%) in Jiangyin (JSB, 2001) , most households have dual wage earners, which makes the low price/income ratio (3.49) more realistic than that in Chongqing. In other words, it is more affordable to be a homeowner in Jiangyin than in either Beijing or Chongqing, which partially explains the high rate of homeownership in Jiangyin.
In summary, households in the three cities are constrained by different housing markets as well as different housing stocks. Households in Beijing and Chongqing face the constraints of a housing stock dominated by public rental housing (and thus limited housing options) and low affordability (because of high housing prices in Beijing and low income in Chongqing). Thus they are relatively more likely to choose public housing and rental. In contrast, households in Jiangyin face fewer constraints because of a diverse housing stock and low prices. They are much more likely to choose private housing and homeownership than those in Beijing and Chongqing.
Government behaviors
Although households are constrained by housing stocks and housing markets as they are elsewhere, they also enjoy housing opportunities brought about by local governments. Local governments behave differently in reducing housing subsidies and implementing new housing policies, which creates very different housing contexts between cities and in turn leads to different housing behaviors.
Persisting house subsidies Housing subsidy is the essence of the welfare-oriented housing system, and its changes can reflect the progress of housing reform and the role of the local government in the transition toward a market-oriented housing system. Heavy subsidies in general indicate a less profound reform and a more conservative local government, which encourages households to remain in the public sector. Although the goal of housing reform is to reduce greatly and eventually eliminate housing subsidies, there are still heavy subsidies in both home purchase and rental. First, owners are heavily subsidized not only through subsidized sale prices of public housing but also through monetary subsidies for housing purchase, both of which encourage homeownership. With the high price/income ratio in Beijing, work units are expected to issue housing-purchase subsidies to their employees (State Council, 1998) , and they are forced to issue heavy subsidies because of the heavy housing subsidies issued by the central-level work units in Beijing. According to the central government, employees in central and state agencies qualify for three types of housing subsidiesö`basic subsidy' ( jizhun butie) with 1265 yuan/m 2 in 1999,`seniority subsidy' (gonglin butie) with a subsidy factor 13 yuan/m 2 per year, and monthly housing subsidy' (yue zhufang butie) with a subsidy factor of 0.66 (CCP COB, 1999) (see table 4 for definitions for these subsidies). Beijing Municipal Government adopted the same three types of subsidy in order to be``consistent to the reform in central and state agencies in Beijing' ' (BMG, 1999) . HPF is another form of subsidy for housing purchase, with work units' contribution increased from 6% in 1997 to 8% in 2000 (CCP COB, 1999) . My survey demonstrates similar heavy subsidies in Beijing, with households paying less than half (46%) of market prices and receiving a cash subsidy from their work units (table 4) . According to the 2000 Census, about 75% of owners in Beijing paid less than 50 000 yuan for their dwellings (table 3) , which is only about two years of household wage income. This is significantly lower than the average price/income ratios calculated from official housing prices, which again indicates heavy monetary subsidies in housing purchase.
Households in Chongqing receive basic subsidy, but not seniority subsidy and monthly housing subsidy (CHRO, 1999) . The basic subsidy is calculated in a similar fashion to that in Beijing, yet employees in Chongqing are qualified to receive subsidies for a larger amount of floor space. For example, regular workers can be subsidized for 80 m 2 (compared with 60 m 2 in Beijing), and cadres at different levels are subsidized for even larger space [97.75 m 2 for division (ke) level cadre, 115 m 2 for department (chu) level cadres, and 161 m 2 for bureau ( ju) level cadres]. If the basic subsidy is distributed monthly, employees can also receive`loan interest subsidy' (daikuai lixi butie) to pay off commercial housing loans (CHRO, 1999) . Chongqing Housing Reform Office (CHRO, 1999) announced a subsidy of 6.8 yuan/m 2 per month, of which 3.5 yuan/m 2 per month is basic subsidy. Thus, compared with those in Beijing, employees in Chongqing receive fewer subsidies, a finding which is also supported by the survey results (table 4). The 2000 Census shows that about 89% of owners paid less than 50 000 yuan for their housing (table 3) , which again is a result of heavy subsidies in housing purchase.
In comparison, owners in Jiangyin receive the lowest subsidies. Although the factor of basic subsidy is 1540 yuan/m 2 , households in Jiangyin qualify for smaller units (for example, 75 m 2 for workers and staff, 90 m 2 for division-level cadres, 110 m 2 for department-level cadres, and 135 m 2 for bureau-level cadres) (JMG, 1998) . For new employees who started work after 1998, monthly housing subsidy of 6% of wage income can be issued (JMG, 1998) . The survey also shows that households in Jiangyin receive less in both price and monetary subsidies (table 4). By 2000 more than 45% of owners in Jiangyin paid more than 50 000 yuan, which is significantly higher than that in Beijing (25.22%) and Chongqing (10.74%), despite the fact that housing prices in Jiangyin are significantly lower. This means that housing subsidies in the owner sector are much lower in Jiangyin.
Second, despite the ongoing rent reform, heavy rent subsidies persist in Beijing and Chongqing, which discourages households from choosing homeownership. Rent for public housing in Beijing has increased from less than 1 yuan/m 2 in 1995 to 3.05 yuan/m 2 in 2000 (BHRO, 2000) . But rent subsidy has increased to average 90 yuan per person (BHRO, 2000) . Households will never pay more than 15% of their income for rent, and low-income households with less than 400 yuan per month will not pay more than 10% of their income (BMG, 2000) . In 2000 about 58% of renters in Beijing paid less than 100 yuan per month (table 3), although the calculated rent for a 100 m 2 apartment should be more than 300 yuan. Similar rent subsidies exist in Chongqing, where rent was only 1.56 yuan/m 2 in 1998, and was less than 5% of household wage income (Li and Dong, 1999) . In 2000 more than 79% of renters pay less than 100 yuan a month for their housing. In contrast, there are no rent subsidies P À 4Wa60. b Seniority subsidy is a cash lump sum to make up for low wages in the years before the Housing Provident Fund was set up. It is the product of the number of years a person has worked in the work unit, the amount of floor space he or she qualifies for subsidy based on job rank, and a subsidy factor. c Loan interest subsidy equals the total amount of interest for a twenty-year loan from the People's Bank of China with the difference between the price for affordable housing and an employee's reasonable share (zhigong heli fudan e) as the principle (CHRO, 1999) . d Monthly housing subsidy is for new employees who started after the end of 1998 (xin zhigong) and old employees who started before 1999 but without access to public housing (wufang lao zhigong). It is the product of an employee's monthly wage and a subsidy factor that will be announced every year.
Housing markets, government behaviors, and housing choice except for the poorest households. Despite it being a small city, rents in Jiangyin were higher than those in Chongqing with 1.75 yuan/m 2 in (JHRO, 2000 , and 2.5 yuan/m 2 in (JMG, 2002 . As a result, about a quarter of renters in Jiangyin paid more than 200 yuan a month in 2000, much higher than the percentages in Beijing (12.7%) and Chongqing (9.1%).
The change in housing subsidies in the first decade of reform reflects the degree of reform and the change in housing relationship between households and public housing agencies. In Jiangyin 44.2% of households claim they received less housing subsidy in 1999 than in 1988 when the housing reform was launched (table 4 ). Yet fewer households in Chongqing (10.3%) and Beijing (31.9%) gave the same response. In fact, two thirds of households in Chongqing and more than one third in Beijing claimed they received more subsidy in 1999 than in 1988, which seems to be contradictory to the aim of the reform. The long history of public housing provision in Chongqing and Beijing has created a strong resistance to housing reform. Realizing the central government's determination to end public housing provision, households hope to receive subsidized housing, and work units want to reward their employees with even more heavily subsidized housing before the end of housing subsidies. For example, in addition to the monetary housing subsidies discussed above, about 60% of commodity housing sold in Beijing in 1998 was purchased by work units who then distributed it to their employees with subsidies, compared with only 26% nationwide (ECCRESY, 1999) . This sudden increase in housing subsidies is a result of the`catching of the last train' mentality ö providing housing subsidies before they are removed, which provides an opportunity for households to access subsidized housing even after the central government declared the end of subsidies in 1998.
The continuing heavy subsidies in Beijing and Chongqing underscore more conservative local governments. Although subsidies in home purchase encourage homeownership especially in the public sector, rent subsidies encourage households to remain in the public rental sector. In contrast, subsidies in Jiangyin are much smaller, indicating a more aggressive local government involvement in the reform. While undermining the attractions of public rental housing with low rent subsidies, the local government encourages households to choose private housing and homeownership with decent subsidies in home purchase.
New housing programs and policies Although local governments' willingness to continue housing subsidies provides opportunities for households to remain in the public sector, their implementation of new housing policies and programs often encourages households to become homeowners and choose private housing. Because the central government lays out only the framework of the housing reform, it is the local government which details the reform and implements policies. So how a local government responds to housing policies by the central government will determine the progress of the housing reform in a city and shape housing behavior.
The central government has issued many documents and regulations on housing reform, of which three are important landmarks ( Although Jiangyin was not chosen by the central government for pilot experiments, it was one of few cities which initiated housing reform as early as 1980 when a small number of public housing units were sold to employees. Jiangyin started to sell commodity housing at market prices in 1984, almost a decade earlier than other cities. Jiangyin was also ahead of most cities in planning the reform and setting up regulations. The municipal government issued a detailed reform scheme in 1993 (JMG No. 129) , which is comparable with the landmark document by State Council in 1994 (No. 43) . In 1997 Jiangyin Municipal Government demonstrated its aggressiveness in housing reform by declaring the end of welfare housing, a year earlier than the central government.
In contrast, the local governments in Chongqing and Beijing are more reluctant and less aggressive in reform, although for somewhat different reasons. In Beijing, where the 1989 incidents took place, the municipal government was not ready to implement the reform issued by the State Council in 1988. Although Beijing Municipal Government issued a reform framework in 1992 (BMG No. 35) as required by the central government, no profound reforms took place. A detailed and comprehensive reform implementation scheme (BMG No. 71) was not issued in Beijing until 1994. Similarly, no significant reform was carried out in Chongqing before 1995. As a heavy industrial city, Chongqing had been suffering from an unprecedented high unemployment rate, which made it socially unacceptable and economically impractical to privatize public housing in the early 1990s. The Chongqing municipal government issued a regulation on the sale of public housing in 1995 (CHRO No. 110 ); yet, a comprehensive housing reform scheme was not issued until 1997 (CMG No. 43) , four years later than that in Jiangyin and three years after the State Council issued a similar scheme. However, the promotion of Chongqing to a municipality in 1996 has injected new energy into the reform, and the reform has been in full swing in the last few years.
Because housing reform aims to promote homeownership through the sale of public and private housing, the different progresses of housing reform in the three cities are also reflected in the different timings of tenure shift from rental to homeownership (table 6) . In Jiangyin about 40% made their tenure shift before reform and another 29.3% in 1994 when a comprehensive reform scheme was introduced nationwide. In Chongqing most households made their tenure shift in 1997 (33.33%) and 1998 (50.45%). Although about 22.2% of households in Beijing became owners during 1992^93, most did so after 1994, especially in 1998 (44.4%). The fact that a large number of households in both Chongqing and Beijing purchased their flats in 1998, the last year subsidized sale of public housing was allowed (State Council, 1998) , is clearly evidence for the`catching the last train' phenomenon.
In summary, local governments in the three selected cities behave very differently in housing reform. In comparison, the municipal government in Jiangyin is more creative and aggressive. It has reduced housing subsidies significantly, and it initiated and implemented housing reforms ahead of the central government as well as local governments in Chongqing and Beijing. With its determination in housing reform, the municipal government in Jiangyin has transformed the housing system into a market-oriented system, which encourages households to choose private housing and homeownership. In contrast, the local governments in Beijing and Chongqing have been less aggressive in reforming the old housing system as indicated by continuing heavy subsidies, which encourage households to remain in the public rental sector. At the same time, their unwillingness to implement housing reform and thè catching the last train' mentality led to low rates of homeownership until 1998. It is obvious that municipal governments in Beijing and Chongqing are more constrained because of the economic, social, and political situations in these two large cities; thus their conservativeness in housing reform cannot be interpreted simply as being caused by the personality of the leadership. Yet their continuing provision of heavy subsidies and slow progress in implementing new programs have created different housing contexts for households. Thus different government behaviors, together with different constraints created by housing stocks and housing markets, affect households' behavior and result in different patterns of housing choice in these three cities.
Conclusions
As part of the institutional transition, housing reform in urban China has significantly changed the previously welfare-oriented housing system by introducing market mechanisms into the provision and allocation of housing. Households in urban China can now choose between renting and owning and between public and private housing, options that were largely impossible in the socialist era. Yet, because of the gradual strategy employed in the reform, the government continues to play significant roles in the housing system, though somewhat differently than in the previous era. Thus the housing context in urban China is different from that both in market economies and in socialist economies. Furthermore, housing reform is a decentralized process with the central government laying out the reform framework and the local governments deciding the speed and actual process of the reform according to local situations. This localized reform further complicates housing contexts in Chinese cities, which leads to different patterns of housing behavior across cities. This research focuses on three cities (Beijing, Chongqing, and Jiangyin) and studies the dynamics of local housing contexts and how they affect housing choice. Various sources of data and information, including census data, fieldwork, survey, and government policy have been used in the analysis, and the findings can be summarized as follows.
First, housing choice varies significantly across cities. Households in Jiangyin are much more likely to choose homeownership and private housing than those in Beijing and Chongqing. Despite the increasing availability of private housing, a large proportion of households in Beijing and Chongqing are still living in public housing. I argue that the different patterns of housing choice across cities can be attributed to different housing stocks, housing markets, and, in particular, different government behaviors between cities. Second, because of different histories of economic development and thus different involvements of the government and public agencies in the housing system, housing stocks vary significantly across cities. In Beijing and Chongqing the central government invested heavily in the urban economy and in housing development, although for somewhat different reasons. Thus housing stocks were dominated by public rental housing, which have not been significantly changed by the recent availability of private housing. In contrast, there was mostly a nonstate economy in Jiangyin and there was little state investment in housing development so that the housing stock historically had a large share of private and owner-occupied housing, which is reinforced by the recent development of commodity housing. As housing stock defines the options of households, it is natural that households in Beijing and Chongqing are more likely to choose or remain in public housing than those in Jiangyin.
Third, as a result of housing reform, housing markets are emerging in Chinese cities, which for the first time in decades makes affordability in housing consumption important. Not surprisingly, housing markets vary across cities, which leads to different patterns of housing choices. The low affordability in Beijing (because of extremely high housing prices) and Chongqing (because of low wages) contributes to low rates of homeownership and fewer choices of private housing, while in Jiangyin housing is more affordable, and thus the choice of homeownership and private housing is the highest. Yet housing markets in Chinese cities are constrained by government policies, and their roles in housing choice have to be understood in conjunction with the role of the government. For example, while high housing prices in Beijing discourage the choice of homeownership and private housing, heavy subsidies in the public sector encourage households to remain in the public sector, which reinforces the impact of high housing prices.
Fourth, although a housing market is emerging, the government continues to affect housing provision and allocation. Although the central government is no longer involved directly in housing provision, as mentioned before, its investment in the urban economy and housing development during the socialist era has created housing stocks dominated by public rental housing, which constrains the options households can enjoy. In comparison, local governments, which design and implement housing policies, influence housing choices more directly. For example, local governments in Beijing and Chongqing did not carry out any reform before 1992, which encouraged households to choose public housing and discouraged tenure shift to homeownership and private housing. The legacy of socialist government still lingers in the housing system. Furthermore, local governments behave very differently in reforming the old housing system and in implementing new housing policies and programs because of local economic and political contexts. In a small city with a long history of private housing, the municipal government in Jiangyin can act aggressively to cut housing subsidies and implement new housing programs, both of which encourage households to choose homeownership and private housing. In comparison, the municipal governments in Beijing and Chongqing are more conservative and reluctant to reform housing. Their continuation of housing subsidies and the`catching the last train' mentality encourage households in these two cities to stay in the public sector. These two municipal governments are also relatively slow in responding to the reform framework set up by the central government, which may force or encourage households to choose private housing. The conservativeness of these two municipal governments may be a result of the presence of high-ranking work units in Beijing, poor economic performance and high unemployment rate in Chongqing, and the history of strong housing dependency between households and public agencies in both cities.
In summary, there are significant intercity differences in housing choice because of different housing stocks and housing markets, on the one hand, and uneven state influences and different local government behaviors, on the other hand. Furthermore, different housing stocks and housing markets are often a result of government behaviors, thus their roles in housing behavior have to be understood together with the role of governments. Despite the decade-long reform and the emergence of a housing market, governments continue to shape local housing contexts within which households choose their housing. Thus, in addition to housing stock and housing market öthe macrolevel factors shaping housing behavior in Western cities, government behaviors also have to be examined in order to understand housing behavior in Chinese cities better.
